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Previous online reputation research has been focused on the effects of positive and negative reputations on trust 
formation, trading price, and probability of sale. We propose that negative feedback rate (NFR) is the most important 
indicator of the risk of buying from a seller online. This proposition has been supported by an empirical study based on 
data collected from eBay.com. We found that the 6-month NFR in the current period predicts much better the future risk 
measured by the NFR in the next 6-month period than did net reputation score and negative reputation score. A seller’s 
life-long negative score in fact was not significant in predicting the future risk. In addition, a seller’s age in the market 
was found to have similar predicting power on risk as did net reputation score.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The prevailing online reputation systems, which provide 
trust-building mechanisms and assurance services on 
eBay, Yahoo auction, Amazon and many other online 
auction marketplaces, have contributed significantly to 
the success of the consumer-to-consumer (C2C) 
electronic commerce. The online reputation systems 
allow traders to leave each other a positive, negative or 
neutral rating after a transaction is finished. The scores 
are then added up as quantitative indicators of traders’ 
reputation records which are available to future traders. 
In addition, traders can leave brief comments on their 
transactions or trading partners for further references. 
 
The effectiveness of online reputation systems in the 
C2C auction market has triggered wide interests from 
the research community. According to the synthesis by 
Dellarocas [4], although some have investigated the 
effect on the probability of selling products [2], 
empirical studies on online reputation are unanimously 
focused on the effect of seller’s feedbacks on item 
prices. However, because of the diverse nature of 
research design, such as different types and categories 
of items being investigated, different measures of 
reputation, different data collection processes, and 
different sample sizes, no consistent findings were 
found across these studies [13]. Positive feedback might 
or might not increase price or probability of sale, and 
the same applies to negative feedback and net reputation 
score, as Resnick et al. [13] summarize from 16 
research reports.  Whereas, accumulated positive and 
negative scores, as well as negative scores from a period 
of time, were found to be the most influencing 
components of seller’s reputation on buyer behavior. 
 
On the other hand, some research has investigated the 
effect of risk or perceived risk on online trading and the 
adoption of trusted third party services (e.g., Antony et 
al. [1]; Hu et al. 2001 [7]). Perceived risk was identified 
as an important determinant of purchasing items and 
adopting trusted third parties’ services in the electronic 
market. Further, perceived risk is subject to change with 
regard to each trading partner’s online reputation.  
 
The basic reputation indicators that can be obtained 
from a C2C online reputation system include positive 
score, negative score, and neutral score (less often used). 
Based on these three basic scores, three combination 
scores can be derived: the total reputation score which 
is the sum of positive, negative and neutral scores, the 
net reputation score which is the difference of positive 
score and negative score accumulated from the ratings 
from unique traders, and the negative feedback rate 
which the ratio of negative score and the total reputation 
score. Presently, a majority of reported research uses 
positive, negative, and net reputation scores as the 
indicators of online reputation, but NFR has not been 
touched yet. 
 
How do these reputation scores reflect the risk of 
trading with a seller? To our knowledge, little research 
has answered this question. So far, majority research 
effort is in the effect of reputation on trust, but not 
aimed at the measure of the risk in the C2C online 
transactions. The main research idea in this paper is 
described in Figure 1. In the dotted box of the figure is a 
typical model used in trust related research (see [8]), 
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where perceived risk is investigated. However, the 
perceived risk does not necessarily match the real risk in 
the future, because online traders’ behavior could be 
irrational. Therefore, this paper is intended to 
investigate the relationship between reputation 
indicators and the risk. We propose that a seller’s 
negative feedback rate (NFR) is the most important 
indicator for predicting the risk of buying from him. 
Based on data collected from eBay, we conducted an 





















Seller Side Buyer Side
?
 
Figure 1: A conceptual model of the research 
 




In the traditional reputation literature, reputation is 
generally defined as the consistency of an entity’s 
behavior over a certain period of time [3][5][14]. It is a 
record of the history of an entity’s interactions with 
others. Thus, reputation building is not a one-time effort 
but is based on the sum of all the past behaviors of the 
entity.  
 
Reputation can be positive or negative. A positive 
reputation manifests all the favorable assessment of an 
entity, while a negative reputation shows the 
unfavorable aspects of the entity. Because the potential 
sacrifice associated with a negative or bad reputation is 
very high, an entity with a positive reputation is 
predicted to behave consistently in a favorable manner 
in the future. In buyer-seller relationships, the seller’s 
reputation has a positive effect on buyer’s trust in the 
seller and buyer’s long-term orientation with the seller 
[6].  
 
In electronic commerce research, Internet buyers are 
found to favor web sites that sell familiar products 
manufactured by familiar merchants [12]. The 
reputation of an online store is positively associated 
with an online consumer’s trust in the store [8]. Further, 
research has shown that the negative reputation has 
much more effect than the positive reputation on buyers’ 
trust because the negative reputation is the repeatedly 
appearance of a seller’s unfavorable behavior that is 
highly associated with the potential trading risk in the 
future (See the review from Dellarocas [4] and Resnick 




According to classical decision theory, risk is “the 
variance of the probability distribution of possible gains 
and losses associated with a particular alternative” ([11], 
pp.1404). The definition is too abstract for the traders in 
the C2C auction market to understand. Following 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung [10], risk is defined as the 
chance or probability of loss. We thus define the 
potential risk of trading with a seller to be the 
probability of leaving the seller a negative feedback. 
Although the reputation system provides detailed 
comments about the negative reputation, a potential 
buyer may not have the resources (cognitive, 
motivational, or other external resources) to search the 
entire archive and find out the exact reasons for the 
negative comments. Further, risk is also associated with 
the significance of loss [11], e.g., how much a buyer can 
lose because of fraud.  
 
2.3 The rationale of the research 
 
In this research we focus on how online negative 
reputation can indicate the real risk in a future online 
transaction. This issue is represented by the question 
mark in Figure 1. Normally, a reputation system does 
not provide a direct causal link between the historical 
negative feedbacks and the information about the 
auctioned item, so that a buyer could not easily figure 
out the probability of future loss. Hence, we argue that a 
potential buyer will rely on the summarized reputation 
information in a seller’s profile to judge the risk level of 
trading with the seller. The definition we have provided 
implies that risk is in the form of probability rather than 
a quantitative number representing the value of the loss. 
In the C2C online auction context, previous research has 
used negative feedback scores to measure risk. This 
measure is not accurate, because a negative feedback 
score does not reflect the probability of getting negative 
feedback in the future. The right measure of such risk 
should be a number signaling the probability of 
unpleasant consequences from the transaction with the 
involved seller. Thus, both the number of negative 
feedbacks the seller has received in a period of time and 
the total number of transactions in the same period of 
time should be considered together. We realize that there 
are several different types of NFRs, e.g., lifetime NFR 
and NFRs during different time periods. They are 
applicable to the same risk analysis purpose depending 
on different timeframes and accuracies. In the later 
discussion, we refer NFR as the NFR calculated from 
reputation scores in a 6-month period from now on. 
 
3.  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
In this section, we report an empirical study based on 
data collected from eBay.com. The purpose of the 
empirical study is twofold. First, we aim to reveal the 
nature of the negative feedbacks through a content 
analysis of the feedback comments. We have not seen 
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any effort of analyzing the diverse contents of the 
reputation feedbacks. Second, we want to justify the 
predictive power of different reputation scores on the 
risk in the transactions with unknown sellers through a 
longitudinal study, using reputation score data collected 
at two time points.  
 
3.1 Study 1 - Content Analysis of Negative Feedback 
Comments 
 
For the content analysis, we randomly collected 216 
unique sellers with negative reputation scores. We 
searched these 216 seller’s transactional history 
archived on eBay.com. We randomly selected one piece 
of feedback comment associated with a negative rating 
to the seller.  
 
As each online negative feedback may link to different 
stories and signal different types of perceived risks, such 
as financial losses, undesired low quality, and 
unsatisfied service, it is necessary to look into negative 
complaints in order to reveal their nature. We are 
interested in why buyers are unhappy with sellers and 
how buyers attribute those complaints. 
 
The authors of this paper worked as independent coders 
of the feedback comments. After finishing coding two 
coders compared the results and resolved the differences 
and discrepancies with a detailed discussion. The 
reliability of inter-coders was 0.90.  
 
The coding was focused on three basic questions: What 
are the causes of negative feedback, merchandize or 
service? Who are responsible for the negative feedback, 
the seller, the buyer, or the third party? Is the negative 








Figure 2: Causes of complaints 
 
Results and Implications 
 
The results of the coding on the three questions are 
shown in Figure 2-4 and Table 1. The three findings are 
discussed as follows:  
 
Not every complaint is related to a merchandise 
problem 
 
Figure 2 indicates that about two thirds of negative 
comments are complaints against merchandise problems. 
More than 30% complaints are related to seller services, 
such as “shipped to wrong address”, “item received 
more than a month”, or “never response to my email”. 
Apparently these complaints are not related to any fraud, 
but reflect buyers’ unpleasant experience. Thus, this 
type of risk is about unsatisfactory transaction that every 
buyer wants to avoid. 
 
According to the responses from the seller, the buyer 
could be the number one trouble maker followed by the 
seller and the third party.   
 
There are many attribution errors in the negative 
feedbacks left by the buyer. According to Table 1, more 
than one third of complaints are because of the buyer. 
Typically, an inexperienced buyer may not understand 
the information of the auctioned item well and does not 
follow the way as an experienced buyer does. This is 
particularly remarkable in the complaints about the 
merchandise. Although this is not the kind of the risk in 
the traditional sense, the over reaction of a buyer may 
incur the retaliation of the annoyed seller returning with 
a negative rating. So the backfiring from the seller or 
uncomfortable feeling of the regrettable outcome is the 
risk the buyer may face under this situation. 
 
Table 1. The liable agents to the complaints 
Complained 
issues 
Seller Buyer 3rd 
party 
Others
Merchandise 18.49% 38.36% 15.07% 28.08%
Service 12.12% 28.79% 19.70% 39.39%
Overall 16.20% 36.11% 16.20% 31.49%
 
In addition, about one sixth of the complaints are related 
to the third party who provides delivery services, 
contracted packing services, or original product supply 
(Figure 3). Although this also has nothing to do with 
fraud, it is one kind of risks that a buyer may encounter. 
As shown in Table 1, sellers are responsible for less than 









Figure 3: The composition of liable agents 
 
More than 40% of the complaints are resolvable or have 
been resolved at the moment they are made. 
 
Figure 4 shows that more than half of the complaints 
can be classified as disputes. Sellers are responsible for 
almost half of complaints (47.95%) to merchandises. 
Less than one fifth (18.49%) of the complaints against 
the merchandise has caused sellers’ harsh responses and 
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ended unpleasantly.  Practically, when a seller has 
responded to a buyer’s complaint regarding the 
merchandise and a dispute is incurred, it becomes 
difficult to justify whether the case is a fraud or not. 
From a prospective buyer’s angle, this is an undesirable 







Figure 4: The resolvability of negative comments 
 
3.2 Study 2 - Predictors of NFR 
 
For the longitudinal analysis, we followed the data 
collection procedure reported in Lin et al. [9]. We first 
collected 2,000 seller’s reputation data in March 2003. 
Six months later, we repeated the data collection using 
the same 2,000 seller IDs. 174 sellers IDs were no 
longer active in the second round collection because 
these sellers have quitted the account, leaving 1,826 




We tested how well the reputation indicators observed 
in the current 6-month period (t0), i.e., NFR, net 
reputation score, accumulated negative feedback, and 
age, can predict an individual seller’s NFR in the next 
6-month period (t1). We used stepwise regression to 
examine the correlation of the NFR in the next period to 
different reputation indicators. The results from the 
Tobit regression model and the OLS model are 
summarized in Table 2. Tobit regression model was 
used because the dependent variable NFR at the second 
point (t1) was censored with a lot of 0’s. In general, the 
regression results from the two models are consistent. 
 
Table 2: Regression analysis of predictors of NFR in the next 6-month period 
Dependent: NFR(t1) 
Tobit Model Ln(NFR(t0)) Age Ln(Net(t0)) Ln( Neg(t0)) N Log Likelihood 
Model 1 0.87       1826 -640.40 
Model 2   -0.0009     1826 -1281.76 
Model 3     -0.40   1826 -1205.80 
Model 4       -0.01ns 1826 -1031.06 
Model 5 0.82 -0.0004     1826 -627.03 
Model 6 0.78   -0.15   1826 -627.55 
Model 7 0.89     -0.11 ns 1826 -633.27 
Model 8 0.78 -0.0003 -0.10   1826 -622.96 
Model 9 0.84 -0.0004   -0.06 ns  1826 -625.38 
Model 10 0.69 -0.0003 -0.22 0.12 ns 1826 -621.50 
OLS Ln(NFR(t0)) Age Ln(Net(t0)) Ln( Neg(t0)) N R2 
Model 1 0.87       468 0.5854 
Model 2   -0.001     468 0.1252 
Model 3     -0.44   468 0.2408 
Model 4       0.01 ns 468 0.0002 
Model 5 0.82 -0.0004     468 0.6084 
Model 6 0.78   -0.15   468 0.6076 
Model 7 0.89     -0.11 ns 468 0.5979 
Model 8 0.78 -0.0003 -0.10   468 0.6152 
Model 9 0.84 -0.0004   -0.06 ns 468 0.6112 
Model 10 0.69 -0.0003 -0.22 0.12 ns 468 0.6176 




Seller’s current NFR is the most significant variable for 
predicting the NFR in the next period  
 
The most important predictor of future risk is the NFR 
in the current 6-month period, which explains the 
highest percentage of the variance of the next period 
NFR (R2 is about 59% from the OLS regression) among 
the four independent variables. This means that the NFR 
is the best among all four variable in predicting the risk 
of trading with an unknown seller in the C2C online 
auction market. The positive relationship suggests that 
the higher the NFR from the current period, the higher 
the NFR in the next period. The contribution of the 
other three variables in explaining the risk level is 
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marginal because their presence has little effect on the 
goodness of fit (for example, 63% vs. 59% of R2 in the 
OLS regression, or -640 vs. –627 of logarithmic 
likelihood in the Tobit regression).  
Net reputation score is negatively correlated to seller’s 
NFR in the next period 
 
The relationship between net reputation score and NFR 
is significantly negative, suggesting that the higher the 
net reputation score, the lower the NFR in the next 
period. This finding is consistent with the findings 
reported in previous literature, in which net reputation 
score has a significant effect on trust and price premium. 
Therefore, our study suggests that net reputation is also 
a significant predictor for the trading risk with a specific 
seller. However, the explanatory power of net reputation 
score (R2 is about 24% in the OLS regression) is not as 
strong as NFR.  
 
An explanation to the discrepancy of the effect of net 
reputation score is that when the net reputation score is 
high, the variance of NFR is low, because sellers with 
high net reputation scores tend to have high transaction 
volumes and their NFRs are relatively stable. The sellers 
with low net reputation score typically have lower 
transaction volume, and the variance of their NFRs is 
higher. Therefore, the NFR is more sensitive to the 
range of net reputation scores. 
 
Seller’s age matters in predicting NFR 
 
The age of a seller also provides the similar explanatory 
power in predicting NFR (R2 is about 13% in the OLS 
regression) as the net reputation score. This implies that 
the longer a seller stays on the market, the lower the 
NFR. Therefore, like net reputation score, a seller’s age 
can be another important measure of his experience and 
tenure in the market. According to Lin et al. [9], in the 
context of market structure research, online reputation 
as the tangible asset for online traders reflect their 
capacity as virtual firms in the electronic market. Based 
on this, our study is the first one that has found that age 
is an effective measure of a seller’s capacity in doing 
business on the market.   
 
A seller’s total negative score accumulated in his 
business life cycle has no effect on NFR 
 
Unlike previous studies who have found significant 
effects of negative feedback on person’s trust and price, 
this study did not find significant effect of negative 
reputation score on the next period NFR (p>0.05). This 
suggests that without considering the total number of 
transactions from which the negative reputation score 
are generated, the risk in a trading cannot be predicted 
accurately. Negative reputation score, an absolute 
number rather than a relative number, cannot tell exactly 
whether it is likely to have an unpleasant outcome in the 
transaction with a seller. The previously reported 
significance of negative reputation score on traders’ 
behavior was only the implication of their irrationality. 
 
According to the above findings, the maturity of a seller, 
signaled by his age and net reputation score, is 
important for estimating the risk level in transacting 
with him. We can refer to this as the “learning effect.” 
The learning effect was also found from the negative 
relationship between transaction volume and negative 
rate (β=-0.0002, p<0.001 R2=0.10). The higher the 
number of transactions, the lower the NFR. Although an 
individual may maximize his effort to conduct a good 
business, his behavior is relatively consistent. If he has 
got higher NFR in the past, he is more likely to get 
higher NFR in the future. This implies that even though 
a trader changes his ID or identities on eBay, if he has 
got a high NFR, he is still likely to get the same level of 
NFR under a new ID, because his ability of doing 
business behind the pseudonym is unimproved. At the 
same time, the costs of switching ID and building new 
reputation may be high, which suggests to the sellers: 
Do not change your ID when you have a high NFR. It 




In this paper, we analyzed the negative feedbacks by 
coding the textual complaint data and examined the 
determinants of future NFR with the historical 
reputation scores. We made two clear contributions to 
the research on C2C auction market. First, we revealed 
the diverse nature of negative reputation. Several 
important findings were derived from analyzing the 
content of the negative feedback comments. Second, we 
proposed to use NFR to measure the potential risk in 
trading with an unknown seller in the electronic market. 
The results of the empirical study could provide 
guidelines for the future buyers to do business online. 
The findings also have important implications for the 
design of reputation systems. Online companies are 
encouraged to report NFR as a measure of reputation of 
traders. We have noticed that since 2004 eBay.com has 
started to provide positive feedback rate on its online 
reputation forum (see Appendix). We reason that the 
positive feedback rate (PFR) might work as an incentive 
for sellers to maintain their reputation and promote the 
effectiveness of eBays’ feedback forum. However, PFR 
is not as straightforward as NFR as an indicator of the 
risk, although rational buyers can derive NFR from PFR. 
If eBay.com can further show the positive feedback rate 
during a period of one month and 6-month, the figures 
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A1: EBay’s reputation forum before 2004 
 
 
A2: EBay’s reputation forum since 2004 
 
 
Feedback Summary  
 
899 positives. 808 are from unique users.  
3 neutrals.  
1 negatives. 1 are from unique users.  
 
 
See all feedback reviews for PQRtraders.  
ID card  PQRtraders ( 807 )  
Member since: Wednesday, Jul 05, 2000 Location: United States  
Summary of Most Recent Reviews  
 Past 7 days  Past month  Past 6 mo.  
Positive  7  30  88  
Neutral  1  1  1  
Negative  0  0  0  
Total  8  31  89  
Bid Retractions  0  0  0      
 
